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The proliferation of regional integration agreements (RIAs) over the past several years 
has led to significant changes in the global configuration of trade and investment 
activity. Multinational enterprises now face the prospect of multilateral trade 
liberalisation that could significantly affect the foreign direct investment (FDI) 
incentive structures that were established within the range of current RIAs. RIAs that 
provide preferential market access to member countries modify firms’ incentives to 
undertake FDI activities and can lead to various permutations of trade and investment 
creation and diversion. This article provides an analytical framework for understanding 
the implications of multilateral trade liberalisation for the incentive structures of firms 
to conduct FDI and discusses how multilateral liberalisation could undo many of the 
FDI activities that were initiated in response to previous RIAs. 
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Introduction  
egional integration agreements (RIAs) are prominent aspects of the international 
economic landscape.
1 The World Trade Organisation (WTO, undated) reports 
that almost 400 RIAs were scheduled to be in force by 2010, with more than 100 new 
RIAs and bilateral agreements since the initiation of Doha Development Agreement 
(DDA) negotiations (The Economist, 2009). Close to 200 of these agreements remain 
in force (see figure 1). There are competing theories that propose explanations for the 
proliferation of RIAs. Krugman (1993) argues that countries turn to RIAs because 
they are more tractable than multilateral agreements, while Baldwin (1997) argues that 
regionalisation is the result of a “domino effect” in which new or expanding RIAs 
generate pressure for non-member countries to join in efforts to avoid the potential 
negative effects of trade diversion. This debate notwithstanding, the proliferation of 
RIAs, especially since the mid 1990s, has had important effects on the global 
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The economic effects of RIAs are commonly analysed through their implications 
for international trade between member countries and non-member countries. Viner 
(1950) showed that a customs union that maintains a common tariff rate on imports 
from non-member countries induces trade creation between member countries as trade 
between member countries with lower production costs replaces less efficient 
domestic suppliers. Meanwhile, RIAs can also divert trade from low-cost non-member 
countries to RIA (potentially high-cost) member countries. These effects may partially 
offset each other, and the formation of an RIA may not increase welfare in member 
countries
 because welfare-improving trade creation is countered by welfare-reducing 
trade diversion.
2 The seminal work of Viner (1950) is followed by a large strand of 
literature that studied the implications of RIAs for welfare.
3,4 
Viner’s (1950) analysis of RIAs is more consistent with the early wave of RIAs 
that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s when FDI that was undertaken by multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) was not a significant factor in international economics.
5 This early 
wave of RIAs differs from the new wave of RIAs that occurred from the 1980s 
onward in two respects. First, the new wave of RIAs takes place in a different milieu 
that is characterized by high levels of FDI and a less fortified world, mainly resulting 
from lower information and communication barriers and from multilateral and 
bilateral agreements. Second, the content of new RIAs steps beyond the conventional 
lessening of cross-border trade barriers to encompass agreements on foreign 
investment and on institutions (e.g., intellectual property rights, right of establishment 
and national treatment of foreign investment). Ethier (2001, 159) highlights the 
importance of FDI in analysing the consequences of regional integration by stating, 
“The new regionalism is taking place in a world fundamentally different from that of 
the old regionalism, so that old-regionalism-theory is not necessarily relevant.”  
FDI activity has been growing rapidly over the past 30 years. Figures from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD’s) FDI statistics 
indicate that the global stock and flow of FDI reached USD 15,210.6 billion and USD 
1,833.3 billion, respectively, in 2006, compared to FDI stock and flow of USD 754.5 
billion and USD 69.6 billion, respectively, in 1980 (figure 2). The U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis reports that sales of foreign affiliates of MNEs in the United 
States and sales of U.S. affiliates in foreign countries reached USD 2,795.1 billion and 
USD 4,793.3 billion, respectively. The level of FDI activity now eclipses the value of 
U.S. merchandise imports and exports, which are valued at USD 1,863.1 billion and 
USD 1,015.8 billion, respectively. Careful analysis of the effects of RIAs and of 
multilateral liberalisation requires consideration of the implications for both cross-
border trade and FDI.   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 















Figure 2  Rapid growth of FDI (billions of USD). 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
The objectives of this research are twofold. The first is to present the theoretical 
incentives for firms to undertake FDI and to provide an analytical framework in which 
to evaluate how these incentives are affected by accession into RIAs. The second 
objective is to analyse how firms’ incentives to conduct FDI are affected by 
multilateral trade liberalisation. We investigate the implications of multilateral 
liberalisation for the configuration of international trade and investment activities for 
trading blocs. More specifically, this article investigates when multilateral 
liberalisation could accentuate the original incentive effects of RIAs on cross-border 
trade and FDI, and when these effects could be reversed. The implications of 
multilateral liberalisation for FDI flows for trading blocs have not been analysed in 
international economics literature, and they are particularly relevant in light of 
movements towards a more liberalised multilateral trading system.  
Section two presents the motives for firms to undertake FDI and discusses the 
effects of RIAs on trade and FDI. Section two also presents an overview of the 
literature on RIAs and summarises empirical estimates of the effects of RIAs on trade 
and FDI flows. Section three discusses the implications of multilateral trade 
liberalisation for the configuration of international commerce for firms that have made 
prior FDI decisions in response to existing RIAs. This section includes a discussion of 
liberalisation in primary agricultural commodities and the potential impacts on food-
processing industries. The final section concludes. 
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Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Integration 
Agreements 
Incentives to Conduct Foreign Direct Investment 
oreign direct investment is an alternative method (to exporting) for firms to 
access consumers in a foreign country, and firms will choose FDI instead of 
exporting if it is a more cost-effective strategy for entering a foreign market. The 
incentives for conducting FDI can be analysed in the context of the ownership-
location-internalisation (OLI) paradigm (Dunning, 1977, 1981). Ownership embodies 
a firm’s advantages in the organisational and technological aspects of production and 
distribution, as well as advantages conferred on a firm by the differentiation of its 
product from rival firms’ products. These advantages amount to a proprietary asset 
that a firm can convey to foreign markets at zero, or negligible, cost and can provide a 
firm with competitive advantages. Firms opt for FDI instead of exporting based on 
attributes of a market’s location. Relatively low labour, resource and other input costs, 
as well as low barriers to FDI, generate incentives for firms to access foreign markets 
via FDI instead of exporting. Two important factors determine a firm’s decision to 
internalise various stages of their supply chains across international borders instead 
of relying on arm’s-length suppliers. First, the higher are the transaction costs of 
securing inputs through the market from external firms, the larger are the incentives to 
internalise production stages through FDI (Coase, 1937). Second, market transactions 
with arm’s-length firms carry a risk of proprietary-asset dissipation as firms imitate 
proprietary production and organisational methods; this can generate competition for 
the original firm. As the risks of dissipation increase, so too do the incentives for 
conducting FDI.
6 
FDI can be conducted vertically along a supply chain, or horizontally across 
markets (Caves, 1971). Horizontal FDI occurs when firms replicate production stages 
across countries; this strategy can act as an alternative to exporting to foreign markets 
(Krugman, 1983; Brainard, 1993; Markusen, 2002; Barba-Navaretti and Venables, 
2004). Incentives to conduct horizontal FDI increase with trade barriers, 
transportation costs and fixed costs at the corporate level. Incentives to conduct 
horizontal FDI decrease with barriers to FDI (e.g., limitations on foreign ownership, 
management and operational restrictions), and scale at the plant level (i.e., the higher 
are the fixed costs of establishing a production facility abroad). Vertical FDI occurs 
when firms separate stages of their supply chains across a range of countries to take 
advantage of different relative factor prices. Labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries may be characterised by vertical FDI into countries where labour costs are 
relatively low. Capital-intensive production stages may then occur in capital-abundant 
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countries, which are often the firms’ respective home (developed) countries. FDI can 
also occur when a firm undertakes downstream wholesaling or retailing operations in 
consumer markets outside its home country.
7 
Effects of Regional Integration Agreements on Foreign 
Direct Investment 
The accession of a country into an RIA can have significant effects on firms’ 
incentives to conduct FDI. Viner’s (1950) inferences on the trade effects of RIAs can 
be extended to investment activities to describe investment diversion and creation that 
can occur as a result of economic integration (Kindleberger, 1966). We summarise 
below the creation/diversion permutations that could arise after the implementation of 
an RIA. 
We first consider a situation that could induce trade creation and investment 
diversion between RIA member countries. Consider an RIA where the relative 
magnitude of reduction in trade barriers (i.e., tariff and non-tariff barriers) outweighs 
the magnitude of reduction in FDI barriers (i.e., taxation on foreign earnings, barriers 
to foreign ownership of capital). In this case, the incentives for a firm headquartered 
in one of the RIA member countries to conduct FDI are reduced because accessing the 
foreign market by cross-border trade has become relatively less costly. Such a firm 
may opt to depend more heavily on cross-border trade rather than on FDI for reaching 
foreign consumers. In this case, the formation of an RIA would induce trade creation 
from an RIA member country directly through the reduction of the cross-border trade 
barriers, and also indirectly by replacing FDI with trade in reaching the consumers of 
the RIA partner country. Investment diversion occurs as production in the trading 
partner is replaced by exports from the firm’s home country. 
A firm’s transition from serving the foreign market by FDI to serving by exporting 
will not necessarily occur immediately because of the firm’s financial commitments to 
fixed assets in the foreign market. Significant sunk costs are likely to be associated 
with a firm’s production facilities in the foreign market, and this commitment 
increases with the degree of asset specificity. A higher degree of asset specificity 
portends more difficulty/higher costs in selling productive assets (e.g., manufacturing 
facilities and equipment) in the foreign market and a resultantly slower transition to 
production in the firm’s home country. However, the primary point remains: accession 
into an RIA changes firms’ incentive structures to conduct FDI as a means of 
accessing foreign markets. The structural shift from production in the foreign country 
to the home country may not occur until current production facilities in the RIA 
partner country are obsolete, in which case replacement facilities would be   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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constructed in the home country instead of replacing obsolete equipment in the 
foreign country. 
A firm’s decision to uproot FDI assets in a foreign country can also be affected by 
several other “noise” factors in the short term. For example, the appreciation of the 
firm’s home-country currency relative to the FDI target market’s currency may delay 
the relocation of production because the sale of assets in the target market and 
purchase of new assets in the home country will be more costly. A temporary spike in 
input costs in the home country relative to the target market can have a similar effect.  
The core incentives for conducting FDI, as described in the OLI paradigm, are 
fundamentally set by the nature of integration between countries, however. These 
“noise” factors, while significant, should not alter the long-run incentives for firms to 
conduct FDI activities. 
RIAs can also generate simultaneous trade creation and investment creation 
between RIA member countries. Consider the case of a firm that has undertaken 
vertical FDI with two production stages split across two countries. An RIA that lowers 
trade and FDI barriers between these two countries will have two effects. First, lower 
trade barriers will induce trade creation as the firm increases intra-firm exports of 
inputs to the downstream production facility. Second, the more liberal FDI 
environment will provide the firm with stronger incentives to expand its FDI in the 
RIA partner country. 
A third possibility is for an RIA to generate incentives that will lead to trade 
diversion and investment creation between RIA member countries. Consider a firm 
that is headquartered in one of the RIA member countries that has undertaken FDI 
expansions into another RIA member country to internalise its proprietary asset. 
Consider now the post-implementation period of an RIA where the transaction costs 
that motivated the firm to internalise its proprietary asset persist. Foreign direct 
investment provisions brought about by the RIA would generate increased incentives 
for more firms to undertake FDI to internalise their proprietary assets in RIA partner 
countries, thereby generating investment creation. Such a situation could lead to trade 
diversion between RIA member countries if the increased incentives to conduct FDI to 
access the foreign market and internalise proprietary assets exceed increased 
incentives to service the foreign market by exporting. 
The formation of an RIA can also generate trade diversion and investment 
creation from RIA non-member countries to RIA member countries. Consider a pre-
RIA setting in which a firm headquartered in an RIA non-member country exports to 
an RIA member country. The implementation of an RIA that excludes the exporting 
country provides preferential market access to RIA member countries, thereby putting   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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the original exporting firm at a competitive disadvantage. This firm could be out-
competed in the RIA member countries by firms headquartered in other RIA member 
countries following the implementation of the agreement. Such a firm may also 
anticipate protectionist practices by RIA member countries against non-member 
countries (e.g., through antidumping policies). In order to overcome the threat of trade 
diversion and maintain the market share, firms of non-member countries will opt for 
FDI. This type of FDI, driven by the incentive to maintain the market share and to 
overcome the implications of trade diversion, is commonly termed defensive trade-
substituting investment (Buckley, 2004). Another essential implication is that the 
formation of the RIA coalesces segmented markets into a single, larger market. This 
will increase the incentives for firms of non-member countries to undertake FDI in 
this larger, integrated market. This type of FDI, driven by larger markets and growing 
demand, is commonly termed offensive trade-substituting investment (Buckley, 2004). 
The original exporting firm in the RIA non-member country will have increased 
incentives to reach consumers by means of FDI in the RIA member country. Trade is 
diverted from the RIA non-member country, and investment is created in the RIA 
member.
8 
Many factors determine the magnitude of the effects of RIAs on the configuration 
of international commerce. Higher barriers to trade such as costs associated with 
international distance (transportation costs, information costs) will lessen the 
implications of trade creation and investment diversion between member countries. 
For example, if source and destination markets are far enough apart, then 
transportation costs could be the constraining factor in the exporting/FDI decision. 
This could render FDI the preferred strategy for accessing the markets of other 
member countries. The implementation of RIAs in terms of preferential market access 
may not be sufficient to overcome the international distance considerations that render 
FDI the preferred mode of international commerce. Therefore, the investment 
diversion effect would be limited. Similarly, investment creation from RIA non-
member countries to RIA member countries could also be limited because the 
majority of FDI opportunities would be already taken to overcome high transportation 
costs. 
A firm’s decision to serve a foreign market by exports or by FDI is ultimately 
dependent on the incentives that it faces under different trade conditions and regimes. 
In the case of new RIAs, these incentives depend on the type of FDI being conducted 
and on the degree of trade and investment liberalisation embodied in the new RIA. 
RIAs can stretch beyond the conventional reduction in trade barriers (e.g., tariffs) to 
cover policies that facilitate FDI by other member countries (e.g., national treatment   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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provisions where investors from an RIA member country are treated as national 
investors, rights of establishment, elimination of trade-related investment measures or 
TRIMS). The next section presents a review of empirical evaluations of the effects of 
RIAs on trade and FDI. 
The Effects of RIAs on Trade and FDI: An Overview of the 
Empirical Literature 
There is a significant literature that investigates the effects of RIAs on cross-border 
trade. Two different approaches are commonly pursued. The first is an ex ante 
approach that uses computable general equilibrium models to simulate the effects of 
RIAs on trade flows (e.g., Brown, Deardorff and Stern, 1992; Brown and Stern, 1989; 
Cox and Harris, 1985). The second approach is an ex post positive one, sometimes 
using the conventional gravity model for aggregate industrial levels (e.g., Frankel and 
Wei, 1996; Frankel, 1997; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997) and for agricultural 
industries (e.g., Koo, Kennedy and Skripnitchenko, 2006; Susanto, Rosson and 
Adcock, 2007; Jayasinghe and Sarker, 2008). Trade creation and trade diversion 
effects of RIAs are captured through two binary variables in these models: one binary 
variable takes the value of one for trade between two RIA member countries and zero 
otherwise, and the other binary variable takes a value of one for trade from an RIA 
non-member country to an RIA member country and zero otherwise. These empirical 
studies generally find evidence of trade creation and trade diversion effects that are 
consistent with theoretical expectations. 
Clausing (2001) studies the welfare implications of the Canada–U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSFTA) for the United States by examining the effects of changes in 
tariffs on changes in import levels. Clausing relies on a parsimonious demand-supply 
system and detects significant evidence of trade creation and no evidence of trade 
diversion as a result of the CUSFTA. These results are interpreted as a welfare-
improving effect of the CUSFTA for the United States. In an alternative approach, 
Romalis (2005) detects significant positive effects of CUSFTA/NAFTA on output and 
small effects on prices. He also finds a smaller-than-anticipated positive effect of 
CUSFTA/NAFTA on welfare, which suggests that positive output effects of trade 
creation are being partially offset by trade diversion. 
Another line of empirical analyses studies the effects of RIAs on the flow and 
stock of FDI. Baldwin, Forslid and Haaland (1996) examine the impact of the 1992 
European Single Market Programme (ESMP) on FDI in member countries of the 
European Union and on FDI in non-member (European Free Trade Association or 
EFTA) countries. Baldwin, Forslid and Haaland find some empirical evidence that the 
ESMP induced an increase in FDI in EU member countries (investment creation) but   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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led to a decrease in FDI in EFTA countries (investment diversion). Baldwin, Forslid 
and Haaland demonstrate, in a simulation model, that the non-participation of EFTA 
countries in the ESMP causes a slight drop in capital stock and that their participation 
would have induced a significant surge in capital stock. 
Blomström and Kokko (1997) argue through descriptive analysis that annual 
bilateral flows of FDI between the United States and Canada do not exhibit clear 
CUSFTA-related patterns. Firms that conducted FDI to overcome cross-border trade 
barriers did not necessarily reduce their reliance on FDI, and firms that conducted FDI 
to internalise their proprietary assets did not necessarily increase their FDI activities. 
Blomström and Kokko also find that the ratio of production of foreign affiliates of 
U.S. MNEs in Canada to Canada’s GDP trended downward after CUSFTA but the 
ratio of production of foreign affiliates of Canadian MNEs in the United States to U.S. 
GDP did not exhibit any clear CUSFTA-related pattern. 
Buckley et al. (2007) employ a dynamic empirical model to determine the effects 
of CUSFTA on the flows of U.S. FDI into Canada. Rather than modelling CUSFTA 
effects as a structural intercept shift, Buckley et al. assess the impact of CUSFTA by 
analysing the coefficients on the theoretical determinants of FDI flows in a regression 
model. Their main finding is that CUSFTA has led to an increase in the 
responsiveness of U.S. FDI flows into Canada by a factor of two. They also find 
positive effects on FDI flows of the real exchange rate of the Canadian dollar relative 
to the U.S. dollar, in line with the expectation that depreciation of the host-country 
currency will render its assets less expensive and make FDI more attractive relative to 
exporting. Finally, Buckley et al. find that an increase in the opportunity costs of 
conducting FDI induces a retraction in FDI flows. 
Regional integration agreements can also have effects on production structure and 
efficiency. Head and Ries (1999) examine whether CUSFTA prompts efficiency 
through rationalization of the production structure (i.e., reduction in the number of 
plants associated with an increase in production per plant). Head and Ries find that 
CUSFTA did not induce a significant increase in the scale of production. They 
attribute this result to currency depreciation, undercounting of small firms and a 
structural shift towards industries that are characterized by large scale.   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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Implications of Multilateral Trade Liberalisation for 
Trade and FDI for Trading Blocs 
he implementation of multilateral trade liberalisation will have important effects 
on the incentives for firms to access foreign markets by exporting or by 
undertaking FDI. The significance of preferential market access to RIA member 
countries will be devalued, and perhaps eliminated entirely, with the transition 
towards a more liberalised global market. We now turn to an analysis of the potential 
implications of multilateral liberalisation for trade and FDI flows for trading blocs. 
Analysing the effects of multilateral integration agreements on the incentives for firms 
to conduct FDI requires the consideration of many aspects. First, we must consider 
how the incentive structures of firms are affected by multilateral integration 
agreements. Second, the incentives for conducting FDI may be different for firms in 
countries that are members of an RIA than for firms from non-member countries. 
Third, multilateral trade liberalisation schemes for final products and for primary 
inputs need to be distinguished from each other and analysed. It may be the case that 
multilateral liberalisation will modify firms’ FDI incentives in a manner that will undo 
FDI decisions that were taken in response to the many RIAs that have emerged since 
the formation of the WTO in 1995. We provide a framework in which to analyse 
firms’ FDI incentives after multilateral liberalisation across firms of members and 
non-members of RIAs. 
Effects on Firms from RIA Member and Non-member 
Countries 
We consider first the implications of multilateral trade liberalisation for firms of RIA 
member countries. Multilateral liberalisation is not expected to have significant direct 
impacts in the case of an existing RIA that initially induced trade creation and 
investment diversion between member countries to gain market access. This is 
because the removal of tariffs between member countries following the RIA formation 
would have already induced rearrangements in the configuration of international 
commerce (i.e., trade and FDI). Multilateral trade liberalisation will therefore not have 
a significant direct impact on firms’ strategies for accessing the markets of other 
member countries. The exception is when RIAs result in only a partial reduction in 
trade barriers between member countries. In such a case, multilateral trade 
liberalisation that removes the remaining trade barriers is expected to mimic the 
effects of the formation of RIAs for member countries in terms of trade creation and 
investment diversion. 
T  P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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There are, however, potential indirect effects that could induce firms of an RIA 
member country to rely more on FDI in accessing the market of another RIA member 
country following the implementation of multilateral trade liberalisation. This is 
because the implementation of multilateral trade liberalisation partially or completely 
erodes the value of preferences given to member countries vis-à-vis non-member 
countries. Consequently, firms of an RIA member country may adopt defensive trade-
substituting investment strategies in order to secure their initial market shares by 
directly engaging in FDI in the other member country. Therefore, there could be a 
tendency to reverse the initial investment-diversion effects. 
The implications of multilateral trade liberalisation for firms of RIA non-member 
countries are expected to be more significant than for member countries. As discussed 
in the previous section, the formation of RIAs would induce trade diversion and 
investment creation from RIA non-member countries to member countries. The 
incentives for firms to conduct FDI in countries that are party to RIAs could be 
reduced after multilateral liberalisation. One of the primary incentives for engaging in 
FDI in an RIA member country is to ensure access to consumer markets without 
having to hurdle border measures. As these border measures fall among new trading 
partners under the disciplines of multilateral agreements, so too will the incentives for 
FDI in RIA member countries, because the advantages of producing in RIA member 
countries will have dissipated. In this case, there may no longer be sufficient 
incentives to produce in RIA member countries just to gain market access. Production 
may be moved to the home country or to locations with other strategic advantages, 
and the trade diversion and investment creation that grew out of the original RIA may 
be undone. 
The pace of trade and FDI realignment depends on production facilities’ degree of 
asset specificity and the rates of capital depreciation and obsolescence. More specific 
assets will slow the pace of readjustment as firms struggle to unload productive assets 
in foreign markets. The pace of realignment will increase with the rates of capital 
depreciation and obsolescence; the sooner productive capital loses its usefulness, the 
sooner firms will relocate production to preferred locations. 
Foreign direct investment that was undertaken by firms from an RIA non-member 
country in response to a larger market size created by an RIA (i.e., offensive trade-
substituting investment) may not be significantly affected by multilateral 
liberalisation. The large market size remains after multilateral liberalisation, so 
improved market access that is derived from a new agreement may not be sufficient to 
undo original FDI activities.   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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One of the primary strategic advantages of conducting FDI is production location 
relative to the destination market. A new multilateral integration agreement may 
provide incentives for firms to move production out of RIA member countries to 
locations that are in geographical proximity to target markets and have lower 
production costs than the original RIA member countries. The relative importance of 
these production costs is magnified in locational decisions after multilateral 
agreements reduce the trade barriers that motivated FDI. Multilateral liberalisation 
will not have significant effects on FDI decisions if the original FDI decision was 
constrained by high transportation costs instead of trade barriers, however.  Improved 
access to destination markets as the result of multilateral trade agreements may not 
sufficiently alter firms’ incentives to move production locations out of destination 
markets after liberalisation if transportation costs are very high. 
Multilateral liberalisation could induce an increase in efficiency of firms of RIA 
non-member countries. Firms that become more efficient increase the value of their 
proprietary assets, and they may opt to internalize these assets by undertaking FDI 
within the RIA region or in a third, non-member country that offers locational 
advantages such as proximity to destination markets and cheap inputs. 
Finally, as discussed in the previous section, RIAs that lower international 
investment barriers are expected to encourage FDI between member countries as firms 
internalise their proprietary assets and overcome high transportation costs. This effect 
would lead to trade diversion and investment creation between RIA member countries. 
New FDI provisions that are associated with multilateral liberalisation schemes are 
expected to have limited direct effects because firms of RIA member countries have 
already benefited from the FDI provisions brought about by the RIA. However, 
multilateral FDI provisions would encourage firms of non-member countries to 
undertake FDI in RIA member countries to internalise their proprietary assets and 
prevent potential asset dissipation in destination markets and to overcome large 
transportation costs. 
Multilateral Trade Liberalisation in Primary Commodities:  
Effects on the Food-Processing Industry 
Trade in primary agricultural commodities will be liberalised if a multilateral DDA 
deal is reached. This liberalisation will change relative commodity prices and is 
expected to have significant effects on the food-processing industry, which uses 
primary agricultural commodities as inputs. Firms spread production processes across 
countries to take advantage of cross-country input and production-cost differences, 
and these incentives are distorted on a global scale by RIAs that grant preferential 
market access to member countries to the exclusion of other countries. RIAs that   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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granted member countries preferential market access may have induced firms from 
outside the RIA to establish processing facilities in RIA member countries with 
relatively high input and production costs, as long as the benefits of market access 
exceeded the higher production costs. This would have resulted in trade diversion and 
investment creation between RIA member and non-member countries. Multilateral 
liberalisation agreements that negate, or at least reduce, preferential market access will 
remove these distortions, and input/production cost factors will become the primary 
considerations in firms’ FDI decisions. 
Firms that are headquartered in countries that were not party to the RIA will have 
lower incentives for FDI in RIA member countries after multilateral liberalisation, and 
will seek out processing locations with relatively cheap input and production costs. 
The original trade diversion and investment creation effects from the RIA could be 
undone, and a new wave of trade creation (from the new production location) and 
investment diversion (as production facilities are relocated out of the RIA member 
country) will occur. 
It is widely expected that liberalisation of global agricultural trade will increase 
the traded prices of many agricultural commodities (see for example, Diao, Somwaru 
and Roe, 2001; Anderson and Martin, 2005). Lower production subsidies will reduce 
production in developed countries, and tighter constraints on export subsidies and 
export credits will reduce exports from developed countries. A uniform increase in 
prices across all countries would not affect FDI incentives; however, the effect on 
prices will not be uniform across countries and will depend on each country’s degree 
of global market integration before and after multilateral liberalisation. For countries 
that are characterised by large import barriers and high domestic prices before 
multilateral liberalisation, the increase in commodity prices may be less dramatic than 
for countries where import barriers were small and domestic prices relatively low. 
This shift in relative commodity prices could have significant effects on food-
processing firms that conduct FDI using agricultural commodities as primary inputs. 
Production facilities may be relocated to, or expanded in, countries where commodity 
inputs are relatively cheap. This process could build on the investment creation that 
occurred as firms of RIA non-member countries located production facilities in RIA 
member countries prior to multilateral liberalisation. For example, RIAs that 
maintained high common import barriers among member countries may experience 
increased inward FDI activity after multilateral liberalisation if domestic commodity 
price increases are smaller than price increases in non-member countries.   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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Rules of Origin 
Another important consideration in analysing the effects of multilateral liberalisation 
on FDI activities is the complicated web of rules of origin (ROOs) that have grown 
out of RIAs. ROOs are the results of efforts by RIA member countries to prevent 
transhipment of products from outside the RIA territory into a member country via 
another member country. For example, if one member country of a customs union 
(country A) has a preferential trade agreement with a country outside the customs 
union (country D), then products could enter other countries (countries B and C) in the 
customs union through country A without being subject to the tariffs that countries B 
and C would normally apply to imports from country D. Most RIAs therefore include 
ROOs that specify the original source of products entering an RIA. Products can only 
be designated as being “made in country A” if certain criteria (e.g., percentage of 
value added to the final product) are satisfied. 
The configuration of international commerce has been significantly affected by 
ROOs, particularly in the case of fragmented vertical supply chains (Augier, Gasiorek 
and Tong, 2005). Firms have adjusted FDI activities to correspond to the incentive 
structures that are established by their trading partners’ ROOs. Using the above 
example, downstream manufacturing firms in country A may have reduced incentives 
to purchase inputs from country D if ROOs would categorise output as originating 
outside the customs union. Multilateral liberalisation will diminish the effect of ROOs 
on firms’ FDI decisions. As the significance of preferential trade barriers is reduced 
through multilateral agreements, the distortionary incentives that were created by 
ROOs will be undone, or at least lessened. The importance of country of origin will 
decline relative to the costs of inputs in firms’ upstream investment decisions. 
Concluding Remarks 
he proliferation of RIAs over the past several years has led to significant changes 
in the global configuration of trade and investment activity. Firms’ incentives to 
access consumer markets by exporting or by FDI have been markedly altered by the 
“spaghetti bowl” (Bhagwati, 1995) of RIAs, and we now face the prospect of 
multilateral trade liberalisation that would significantly affect the FDI incentive 
structures that were established within the range of current RIAs. 
RIAs that provide preferential market access to member countries modify firms’ 
incentives to undertake FDI activities and can lead to various permutations of trade 
and investment creation and diversion. The net effects of the changes to incentives 
depend on the relative degree of liberalisation between trade and investment, and on 
the various factors that induce investment. 
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The prospect of a DDA agreement highlights the importance of analysing how 
multilateral liberalisation could affect the incentives for FDI by firms that are 
headquartered in and out of existing RIAs. Multilateral liberalisation has the potential 
to change incentive structures in a manner that would undo many of the FDI activities 
undertaken in response to previous RIAs. These effects could be significant and must 
be considered in an ex ante evaluation of multilateral trade liberalisation.   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
∗   We are grateful to Ian Sheldon and participants at the Canadian Agricultural 
Economics Society Annual Workshop in Quebec City on October 23, 2009 for 
helpful comments. 
1.  The terms regional integration agreement (RIA) and regional trade agreement 
(RTA) represent interchangeable notions. However, the former is commonly used 
in the literature when the analyses encompass foreign direct investment (FDI). 
2.  Pomfret (1997) considers the case of a free trade area (FTA) where member 
countries retain independent external trade barriers vis-à-vis non-member 
countries. He shows that member countries with relatively lower trade barriers 
against non-member countries might in fact experience welfare improvements, 
while other member countries with relatively higher trade barriers against non-
member countries might experience welfare reductions. Welfare improvements of 
member countries with relatively lower trade barriers are the result of trade 
creation with both member and non-member countries. 
3.  The seminal work of Viner initiated a strand of literature that focused on global 
welfare implications of RIAs (e.g., Krugman, 1991a, 1991b; Deardorff and Stern, 
1992; Haveman, 1992; Frankel, 1997; and Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1998). This 
literature focused on whether the enlargement of RIAs, in the sense of more 
members in each bloc and fewer blocs, induces a monotonic improvement in 
global welfare. Another strand of theoretical literature studies the welfare 
implications of RIAs for the member countries (e.g., Krugman, 1991b, 1994; 
Kennan and Riezman, 1990; Michaely, 1998). 
4.  Viner’s (1950) theory is not immune to critiques. For example, Meade (1955) 
questions the validity of Viner’s infinite supply elasticity assumption. 
5.  Investment is considered to be FDI when the parent enterprise has some control 
over the foreign affiliate, commonly specified at 10 percent or more of shares or 
voting power of an incorporated firm or its equivalent for an unincorporated firm 
(OECD, 1996). 
6.  The literature also suggests additional incentives to undertake FDI, such as risk 
diversification where multinational enterprises (MNEs) can diversify risk across 
geographic dimensions and/or product dimensions (Rugman, 1975) and rivalry 
between oligopolistic firms (Knickerbocker, 1973). 
7.  Many MNEs pursue mixed strategies through both vertical and horizontal FDI 
expansions. For example, a meat-processing firm can horizontally expand into 
foreign countries while also engaging in backward FDI to acquire livestock inputs 
in the foreign market. 
8.  Analyses of RIAs that measure welfare through the magnitude of trade and 
operational aspects of FDI (i.e., transactions of foreign affiliates of MNEs) 
overlook other potential sources of welfare gain. For example, RIAs are 
considered to be catalysts to reap economies of scale and to spur competitiveness 
and efficiency. 
   P. Ghazalian and R. Cardwell 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    212
                                                                                                                                            
The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those 
of the Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy nor the Estey 
Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade.  © The Estey Centre for Law 
and Economics in International Trade. ISSN: 1496-5208 